Delegation in predicate encryption supporting disjunctive queries by Sun, Donald et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Sun, Dongdong, Boyd, Colin, & Gonzalez Nieto, Juan Manuel (2010) Del-
egation in predicate encryption supporting disjunctive queries. In Ran-
nenberg, Kai & Varadharajan, Vijay (Eds.) IFIP Advances in Information
and Communication Technology : Proceedings of 25th IFIP TC-11 Inter-
national Information Security Conference, SEC 2010, Springer, Brisbane,
pp. 229-240.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/37964/
c©Copyright 2010 International Federation of Information Processing
This is the author-version of the work.
Conference proceedings published, by Springer Verlag, will be available
via SpringerLink. http://www.springerlink.com
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15257-3
Delegation in Predicate Encryption
Supporting Disjunctive Queries
Abstract
Predicate encryption has an advantage over traditional public-key or identity-based encryp-
tion, since predicate encryption systems provide more flexible control over access to encrypted
data. We focus on delegation capabilities in predicate systems. More specifically, we investi-
gate delegatable encryption systems supporting disjunctive predicate evaluations. We present
formal security definitions of delegatable predicate encryption and provide the first delegatable
predicate encryption scheme which supports disjunctive predicate evaluations in the public-key
setting. We analyze the security of the proposed system and give a security proof. In addi-
tion, we present a delegatable predicate encryption in the symmetric-key setting and discuss the
related security issues.
Keywords: Predicate Encryption, Delegation, Disjunction
1 Introduction
Traditional public-key encryption systems have been used and investigated for decades. In those
systems, a user creates a public and private key pair, and the message can be encrypted with the
public key and recovered with the corresponding private key. This is sufficient for many applications,
where a user knows the identity of the recipient in advance. However, in other applications, a user
may require more flexible control over the access to the encrypted data. Predicate encryption is
a new primitive which can achieve such flexibility. In predicate-based encryption, private keys are
associated with predicates f and ciphertexts are bound to attributes I. A ciphertext corresponding
to I can be decrypted by a private key corresponding to f if and only if f(I) = 1.
There are a number of contributions to predicate encryption in the literature [1, 6, 9, 11, 16,
24, 25, 10, 19, 23]. Those systems can evaluate various predicates over the ciphertext. The most
expressive one is the KSW [19] construction, which can support a wide class of predicates including
disjunctive predicate evaluations. The system is well suited for many applications. For example,
in a bank, for the sake of security, each internal file is labeled with an attribute and both file
and attribute are encrypted with the system public key. We assume that the general manager,
who is the top authority, holds the master secret key. He can issue a secret key associated with a
predicate, the disjunctive predicate in our case. Staffs have different privileges to access files. People
in IT department are allowed to read technical files, and those in customer service department are
allowed to read all customer related files. On top of that, there are some files which the general
manager wants to make ensure that everyone should read (e.g., bank policy). For each staff, the
general manager will encode the predicate, which is associated with attributes in disjunctive form.
For example, an IT staff member may receive a key corresponding to predicate (x = “Bank
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Policy”) ∨ (x = “Tech Manual A”) ∨ (x = “Tech Manual B”), so he can decrypt the files
whenever the attribute in the file matches any one of three attributes in the predicate. Moreover, a
crucial property of the disjunctive predicate, namely predicate indistinguishability, is applicable to
our specific application. The predicate indistinguishability means if an attribute in the ciphertext
matches the disjunctive predicate, it is computationally infeasible to find the position of a match,
only the existence of a match in at least one position is known [19]. For example, each profile
of a customer is encrypted with the customer’s account number (i.e., the attribute). The profile
includes the general information about the customer, e.g., name, address, deposit amount, recent
transactions. Now the general manager needs some statistics on those profiles. He computes a
secret key associated with the predicate (x = “CustomerA’s Account Number”) ∨ (x =
“CustomerB’s Account Number”) ∨ (x = “CustomerC’s Account Number”) ∨ (x =
“CustomerD’s Account Number”), and sends the key to the staff who is responsible for doing
statistics. With that key, the staff can decrypt all profiles related to the predicate. We assume that
he knows the predicate, since in the public-key settings, secret keys may reveal some information
about the encoded predicate. However, upon decryption, he cannot tell which customer’s account
number is related to the decrypted profile due to the property of predicate indistinguishability. For
the security consideration, the property is certainly desirable if the staff is not deem to be able to
identify the relationship between the account number and the profile.
The above-mentioned scenario is sufficient for a small company. If there are hundreds of thou-
sands of staffs, it is not efficient to let only one authority (i.e., the general manager) to compute
all keys. Delegation is an attractive solution to the issue. Generally speaking, this mechanism can
spread the computational tasks to other entities. We stick with our bank example. Now, instead
of computing all secret keys the general manager delegates the tasks to his subordinates, i.e., man-
agers. More specifically, the general manager first computes a key associated with a predicate, e.g.,
(x = “Bank Policy” ∨ ? ∨ ?), where ? is a delegatable field. He sends this key to one of the
managers, e.g., a technical manager. The technical manager then creates a key for the predicate
(x = “Bank Policy”) ∨ (x = “Tech Manual A”) ∨ (x = “Tech Manual B”) and gives it to
one of the staffs in his department. In this scenario, we have some restrictions. Only the general
manager holds the master secret key so that he can initialize the key with some attributes and
ensure no managers can modify those fixed attributes (the managers can only fill in the delegatable
fields). We also assume the general manager and other managers are authorities who can access any
files. The staffs on the lowest level can only obtain keys without delegatable fields. The managers
must ensure they give the non-delegatable keys to the staffs. One may argue that we can give
the master secret key to all managers, because they have right to decrypt any files. However, as
mentioned before, the general manager wants to ensure that some files (e.g., bank policies) should
be decrypted by anyone in the bank. By holding the master key, he can always initialize the key
with some attributes, e.g., (x = “Bank Policy” ∨ ? ∨ ?), which ensures that anyone can access
“Bank Policy”.
Now, all keys can be computed in an efficient way with the help of the managers. For simplicity,
we present the delegation in two level hierarchy. The delegation can also be applied in more than
two levels. We will present a security system which can handle the above mentioned situations in
this paper.
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1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we present formal security definitions of delegatable predicate encryption supporting
disjunctive predicate evaluations. We also present a delegatable predicate encryption scheme in the
public-key setting. Our scheme is based on the KSW [19] construction but, unlike their scheme,
we achieve delegation. A formal security proof of our scheme is also provided. The required
security assumptions have all been introduced in prior works. As a side product, we also apply our
delegating technique to the SSW [23] construction to achieve a delegatable predicate encryption
in the symmetric-key setting. We briefly discuss the corresponding security definitions and proofs.
Our systems are based on a group whose order is the product of four primes. In summary, our
contributions are as follows.
• We provide formal definitions of security for delegatable predicate encryption supporting
disjunctive predicate evaluations.
• We present the first delegatable predicate encryption scheme evaluating disjunctive predicate
in the public-key setting.
• We present a formal security proof for our proposed scheme.
• We apply our delegation technique to construct a delegatable predicate encryption scheme
evaluating disjunctive predicate in the symmetric-key setting.
1.2 Related Work
Identity-Based Encryption and Attribute-Based Encryption. To address the issue of cer-
tificate overhead in the PKI system, Shamir [22] introduced the notion of identity-based cryptog-
raphy. The first practical ID-based encryption (IBE) was proposed by Boneh et al [7]. Thereafter,
many efficient ID-based schemes have been proposed [26, 3, 27, 14, 4]. Because of the efficiency of
the system, ID-based cryptography is now flourishing in the cryptographic community. In attribute-
based encryption (ABE) [17, 20, 2, 21, 13], a user can receive a secret key associated with an access
control policy over the attributes of an encrypted data.
IBE and ABE can be cast in the framework of predicate encryption. IBE can be viewed as pred-
icate encryption supporting equality evaluations. The standard IBE [15, 4] corresponds to payload
hiding, while anonymous IBE [7, 11] corresponds to attribute hiding. ABE achieves payload hiding
only. However, the system we consider in this paper achieves attribute-hiding, which means the
ciphertext hides the message as well as the associated attributes.
Predicate-Based Encryption. Recently, Boneh and Waters [10] proposed the first encryption
system possessing the properties of conjunctive, subset and range queries in the public-key set-
ting. Concurrent work by Shi et al. [24] also achieves a similar function. However, they achieve
match-revealing instead of match-concealing. How to construct a system supporting disjunctive
predicate was left as an open problem until the work by Katz et al [19]. The system can evaluate
predicates corresponding to disjunctions, polynomials and CNF/DNF formulae. The underlying
tool used to construct the system is an encryption scheme which evaluates predicates corresponding
to the computation of inner products over ZN (for some large integer N). The KSW system can
be regarded as a significant improvement in the theory of predicate-based encryptions. Their work
also implies all the results of the BW construction [10]. Based on the KSW system, Shen et al [23]
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propose a similar system in the symmetric-key setting. Their system achieves predicate privacy as
well as data privacy.
Delegation in Predicate Encryption. The notion of delegation was first introduced in this
context by Horwitz and Lynn [18]. Subsequently, a number of works address delegation issues in
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) [11, 5]. The most related context of delegation in
predicate encryption appeared in the work of Shi and Waters [25]. They construct a delegatable
predicate encryption supporting conjunctive queries. However, to construct a system supporting
disjunctive queries was left as an open problem, which motivates us to investigate the new system
in this paper.
2 Definitions
We describe definitions in our specific settings, where the class of predicates is P = {ORx1,...,xl(x)|
(x1, . . . , xl) ∈ ZlN} such that ORx1,...,xl(x) = 1 iff x = x1 or x = x2, . . . , or x = xl. The above-
mentioned disjunctive predicate evaluation is based on inner product predicate evaluation which
was specified in the work of Katz et al [19]. When we have a message M for the attribute w ∈ ZN to
encrypt, we set ~w := (wl mod N, . . . , w0 mod N) ∈ ZnN , where n = l+1, then encrypt ~w with M .
To compute a secret key for predicate ORx1,...,xl(x), we compute a polynomial p(x) =
∏
i∈[l](x−xi)
mod N and set ~p := (al, ..., a0), where al, . . . , a0 are the coefficients of p(x). We then compute the
secret key on ~p. The actual evaluation is based on the class of predicates F = {f~x|~x ∈ ZnN}, where
f~x(~y) = 1 iff 〈~x, ~y〉 = 0 mod N . As shown by Katz et al [19], ORx1,...,xl(w) = 1 iff f~p(~w) = 1,
which forms the bases for our systems. In all our definitions, we let Ω denote a finite set of ZN and
Ω? = Ω ∪ {?}, where ? is a delegatable field.
Definition 1 A Delegatable Predicate Encryption Scheme comprises of the following algorithms:
Setup(1λ) The Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs a public key
PK and a master secret key MSK .
Encrypt(PK,w,M) The Encrypt algorithm takes as input a public key PK, an attribute w ∈ Ω,
and a message M in some associated message space. It outputs a ciphertext C.
GenKey(MSK , X) The GenKey algorithm takes as input a master secret key MSK and an attribute
vector X = (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl? (l is fixed in the system), which corresponds to predicate ORX(x).
It outputs a secret key SKX for evaluating ORX(x) over a ciphertext C.
Delegate(SKX , xˆ) The Delegate algorithm takes as input a secret key SKX for ORX(x) and an
attribute xˆ. It outputs a delegated secret key SKX′ for the predicate ORX′(x), where X
′ is
obtained by fixing one of the delegatable fields of X with the attribute xˆ.
Query (SKX , C) The Query algorithm takes as input a secret key SKX and a ciphertext C. It
outputs either a message M or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
Correctness. We require the following correctness property. For all λ, all (w,M) ∈ Ω×M, and all
ORX ∈ P , let (PK,MSK ) R← Setup(1λ), C R← Encrypt(PK,w,M), and SKX R← GenKey(MSK , X).
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• If ORX(w) = 1 then Query(SKX , C) = M .
• If ORX(w) = 0 then Query(SKX , C) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The same property holds, if SKX is computed from Delegate algorithm.
Selective Security. We will prove the selective security of our scheme. The concept of selective
security was first introduced by Canetti et al [12], and has been used extensively in the literature [12,
3, 9, 11, 24]. Our system is secure against an adversary who can request the key with no delegatable
fields, otherwise he can delegate to compute a key to decrypt any ciphertext of his choice. Our
security definition is similar to that of KSW [19], except that there are extra create delegated
secret key queries. In those queries, an adversary requests a key for a full attribute vector without
delegatable fields, then a challenger computes a parent key corresponding to the random attributes
of his choice in the full attribute vector, and uses the parent key to compute the key for full attribute
vector delegatability. The formal definition of selective security is provided below. The definition
of full security can be found in Appendix A.
Definition 2 A delegatable predicate encryption scheme is selective secure if for all PPT ad-
versaries A, the advantage AdvA of A in the following game is a negligible function of security
parameter λ:
Setup(1λ). A challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate public key PK and master secret
key MSK , a public key value N is given to A.
Init. A outputs vectors ~a,~b ∈ Ωn, which correspond to attributes A, B ∈ Ω, and is then given
PK.
Query phase 1. A adaptively makes a polynomial number of the following queries:
• Create secret key. A requests a secret key for a vector ~p ∈ Ωn corresponding to predicate
ORX(x), where X = (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl. C creates the secret key and gives it to A.
• Create delegated secret key. A requests a secret key for a vector ~p ∈ Ωn corresponding to
predicate ORX(x), where X = (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl. C chooses a random number i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ l and creates the secret key for ORXi(x), where Xi = (x1, . . . , xi). Using that
key as the parent key, C creates the key for ORX(x) in delegatable way.
Any key revealed to A are subject to the restriction such that ORX(A) = ORX(B), which is
equivalent to f~p(~a) = f~p(~b).
Challenge. A outputs two equal-length messages M0 and M1. If there is any ORX(A) =
ORX(B) = 1, then it is required that M0 = M1. C flips a random coin b. If b = 0 then
A is given C = Encrypt(Mb, A) and if b = 1 then A is given C = Encrypt(Mb, B).
Query phase 2. Repeat the Query phase 1 subject to the restrictions as before.
Guess. A outputs a guess b′ of b, and succeeds if b′ = b.
The advantage of A is defined to be AdvA = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
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3 Background on Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
We review the notions about groups of composite order and bilinear maps. The bilinear groups of
composite order was first introduced by Boneh et al [8].
Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs a tuple
(p, q, r, s,G,GT , e) where p, q, r, s are distinct primes, G and GT are two cyclic groups of or-
der N = pqrs, and e is a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G × G → GT satisfying the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G,∀a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: if g generates G then e(g, g) generates GT
We assume the group computation in G and GT , as well as the bilinear map e, are all computable
in time polynomial in λ. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and GT includes
generators of G and GT respectively.
We will use the notation Gp,Gq,Gr,Gs to denote the respective subgroups of order p, order q,
order r and order s of G and we will use the notation GT,p,GT,q,GT,r,GT,s to denote the respective
subgroups of order p, order q, order r and order s of GT . There is a crucial property in composite
order bilinear map: if hp ∈ Gp and hq ∈ Gq, then e(hp, hq) = 1. This property holds whenever e is
applied to elements in any two distinct subgroups.
3.1 The composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption
The composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption (C3DH) was first introduced by Boneh and
Waters [10]. For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (1λ):
(p, q, r, s,G,GT , e)
R← G(1λ), N ← pqrs, gp R← Gp, gq R← Gq, gr R← Gr, gs R← Gs
R1, R2, R3
R← Gq, a, b, c R← ZN
Z¯ ← ((N,G,GT , e), gq, gp, gr, gs, gap , gbp, gabp R1, gabcp R2)
T ← gcpR3
Output(Z¯, T )
For an algorithm A, define A’s advantage in solving the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman
problem for G as:
C3DHAdvG,A(1λ) := |Pr[A(Z¯, T ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z¯, R) = 1]|
where (Z¯, T )
R← P (1λ) and R R← Gpq.
Definition 3 We say that G satisfies the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption (C3DH) if
for any polynomial time algorithm A, its advantage C3DHAdvG,A(1λ) is negligible in the security
parameter λ.
The assumption is formed around the intuition that it is hard to test for Diffie-Hellman tuples
in the subgroup Gp if the elements have a random Gq subgroup component.
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3.2 Other Assumptions
Security of our system also relies on two assumptions introduced by Katz et al [19].
Assumption 1. For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (1λ):
(p, q, r, s,G,GT , e)
R← G(1λ), N ← pqrs, gp R← Gp, gq R← Gq, gr R← Gr, gs R← Gs
Q1, Q2
R← Gq, R1, R2, R3 R← Gr, a, b, c R← Zp
Z¯ ← ((N,G,GT , e), gp, gr, gs, gqR1, gbp, gb
2
p , g
a
pgq, g
ab
p Q1, g
c
p, g
bc
p Q2R2)
β
R← Zq
T ← gb2cp gβqR3
For an algorithm A, define A’s advantage in the above experiment for G as:
A1AdvG,A(1λ) := |Pr[A(Z¯, gb2cp R3) = 1]− Pr[A(Z¯, gb
2c
p g
β
qR3) = 1]|
Definition 4 We say that G satisfies the assumption 1 if for any polynomial time algorithm A, its
advantage A1AdvG,A(1λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Assumption 2. For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (1λ):
(p, q, r, s,G,GT , e)
R← G(1λ), N ← pqrs, gp R← Gp, gq R← Gq, gr R← Gr, gs R← Gs
h
R← Gp, Q1, Q2 R← Gq, c, γ R← Zq
Z¯ ← ((N,G,GT , e), gp, gq, gr, gs, h, gcp, hcQ1, gγpQ2, e(gp, h)γ)
T ← e(gp, h)γc
Output(Z¯, T )
For an algorithm A, define A’s advantage in the above experiment for G as:
A2AdvG,A(1λ) := |Pr[A(Z¯, T ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z¯, R) = 1]|
where (Z¯, T )
R← P (1λ) and R R← GT .
Definition 5 We say that G satisfies the assumption 2 if for any polynomial time algorithm A, its
advantage A2AdvG,A(1λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
The above two assumptions imply the hardness of finding any non-trivial factor of N . They are
proven to hold in the generic group by Katz et al [19].
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4 Our Scheme
We construct our delegatable predicate encryption scheme by extending the KSW system [19]. Our
scheme is exactly the same as the KSW construction, with exception of GenKey and extra Delegate
algorithms. Hence, the scheme possesses all the properties of the KSW system. In our construction,
we require that the fixed attributes associated with the disjunctive predicate cannot be modified
by anyone. Only the delegatable fields can be filled in. More specifically, it is hard to obtain the
parent key by carrying out computations on the child keys, which is called collusion attack. On
the technical level, our construction is based on the following observations. Assume that we have
a key for the predicate ((x = a) ∨ (x = b) ∨ ? ), where ? is a delegatable field. The predicate can
be rewritten in polynomial equation p(x) = (x − a) · (x − b). If we fill in x = c in the third field,
then the equation is
p′(x) = (x− a) · (x− b) · (x− c)
= p(x) · x+ p(x) · (−c).
As specified in Section 2, we know that the coefficients of the above polynomials will be en-
coded into secret keys. Our secret key SK consists of two components, a decryption key component
DK and a delegation component DL. Assume coefficients of p(x) is encoded in secret key SKZ .
We can shift elements in DKZ to obtain the elements associated with p(x) · x and raise elements
in DLZ to the power of (−c) to obtain the elements associated with p(x) · (−c). We combine DLZ
and DKZ to obtain keys corresponding to p
′(x). More details can be found in the following scheme.
Setup(1λ) The setup algorithm first picks random large primes p, q, r, s and creates groups G and
GT of composite order N = pqrs. It then computes gp, gq, gr and gs as generators of group
Gp,Gq,Gr and Gs, respectively. Next, it randomly chooses R1,i, R2,i ∈ Gr and h1,i, h2,i ∈ Gp,
where i = 1 to n. It also chooses R0 ∈ Gr, γ ∈ Zp and h ∈ Gp at random, and sets l = n− 1,
which is the size of the attribute vector. It publishes (N = pqrs,G,GT ) and the values
PK = ( gp, gr, gs, Q = gq ·R0, P = e(gp, h)γ , l, {H1,i = h1,i ·R1,i, H2,i = h2,i ·R2,i}ni=1 ) .
The master secret key MSK is (p, q, r, s, gq, h
−γ , {h1,i, h2,i}ni=1).
Encrypt(PK,w ∈ Ω,M ∈ M ⊆ GT ) Assume that Ω ⊆ ZN . M is some efficiently-recognizable
subgroup of GT . To encrypt a message M for the attribute w, the algorithm computes
(w1 = w
0 mod N, . . . , wn = w
n−1 mod N). Then, it chooses random δ, α, β ∈ ZN and
R3,i, R4,i ∈ Gr for i = 1 to n. The ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·wi ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·wi ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
GenKey(MSK , X ∈ Ωl?) Assume Ω? = Ω ∪ {?}, where ? is a delegatable field. Let X =
(x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl?. I(X) denotes the set of all indices u where xu ∈ Ω. This algorithm
encodes X as a univariate polynomial p(x) =
∏
u∈I(X)(x−xu) mod N , and then extends the
equation to obtain p(x) = aI+1x
I + · · ·+a1x0 mod N , where aI+1, . . . , a1 are the coefficients
of the resulting polynomial and I is the number of all fixed fields. The secret key for X
consists of two parts: a decryption key component DK and a delegation component DL.
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• DK: Choose random r1,i, r2,i ∈ Zp and Y, Y1,i, Y2,i ∈ Gs for i = 1 to n (n = l+1), random
R5 ∈ Gr, random f1, f2 ∈ Zq and random Q6 ∈ Gq. The decryption key is
DK =
 K = R5 ·Q6 · h−γ ·∏ni=1 h−r1,i1,i · h−r2,i2,i · Y,
{K1,i = gr1,ip · gf1·aiq · Y1,i, K2,i = gr2,ip · gf2·aiq · Y2,i}ni=1

• DL: Let w denotes the number of delegatable fields. The algorithm computes w parallel
components. They have similar structures with the decryption key component. The
main difference is that only the decryption key component contains the master secret
h−γ . LetW = {1, . . . , w}. For each v ∈ W, for i = 1 to n, choose random r1,i,v, r2,i,v ∈ Zp
and Y1,i,v, Y2,i,v ∈ Gs. For each v ∈ W, choose random R5,v ∈ Gr, random Yv ∈ Gs and
random Q6,v ∈ Gq. The delegation component is
∀v ∈ W : DLv =
 Lv = R5,v ·Q6,v ·∏ni=1 h−r1,i,v1,i · h−r2,i,v2,i · Yv,
{L1,i,v = gr1,i,vp · gf1·aiq · Y1,i,v, L2,i,v = gr2,i,vp · gf2·aiq · Y2,i,v}ni=1

NB: Set ai = 0 for i > I + 1.
Delegate(SKX∈Ωl? , xˆ ∈ Ω) Given a secret key for X and an attribute xˆ, this algorithm fixes one of
the delegatable fields of X with xˆ to obtain X ′, and computes the secret key for X ′. Clearly,
if we can perform delegation on one field, then we can perform delegation on multiple fields.
If there is no delegatable field, the algorithm simply aborts.
Step 1: Let (DK,DL) denote the secret key for X with w delegatable fields. Pick a random
µ ∈ ZN and rerandomize the wth delegation component DLw by raising every element
in DLw to µ:
DˆL =
(
Lˆ = Lµw, {Lˆ1,i = Lµ1,i,w, Lˆ2,i = Lµ2,i,w}ni=1
)
Step 2: Multiply the decryption key component DK by DˆL:
DˆK =
(
Kˆ = K · Lˆ, {Kˆ1,i = K1,i · Lˆ1,i, Kˆ2,i = K2,i · Lˆ2,i}ni=1
)
Step 3: Multiply the delegation component DLv by DˆL for all v ∈ W ′, where W ′ =
{1, . . . , w − 1}:
∀v ∈ W ′ : DˆLv =
(
Lˆv = Lv · Lˆ, {Lˆ1,i,v = L1,i,v · Lˆ1,i, Lˆ2,i,v = L2,i,v · Lˆ2,i}ni=1
)
Step 4: Perform a circular shift on the randomized decryption key component DˆK:
pDK =

pK = Kˆ,
pK1,1 = Kˆ1,n, pK2,1 = Kˆ2,n
{pK1,i = Kˆ1,i−1, pK2,i = Kˆ2,i−1}ni=2

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Step 5: Compute decryption key component DK ′ for X ′. DK ′ is computed from two com-
ponents: 1) pDK, the shifted decryption key component of secret key for X. 2) DˆL1,
the randomized delegation component for X. First randomly select Y ′, Y ′1,i, Y
′
2,i ∈ Gs
for i = 1 to n, then raise every element in DˆL1 to −xˆ, output the following DK ′:
DK ′ =
(
K ′ = Lˆ−xˆ1 · pK · Y ′, {K ′1,i = Lˆ−xˆ1,i,1 · pK1,i · Y ′1,i, K ′2,i = Lˆ−xˆ2,i,1 · pK2,i · Y ′2,i}ni=1
)
Step 6: Compute delegation component DL′ of X ′. DL′ is computed from the randomized
delegation component DˆLv for all v ∈ W ′, where W ′ = {1, . . . , w − 1}. Generally
speaking, each time the algorithm performs some computations on two of the DˆLv
components to obtain a DL′ component. The resulting DL′ will consists of w − 1
components. For example, choose DˆL1 and DˆL2 to compute DL
′
1, then choose DˆL2 and
DˆL3 to compute DL
′
2, etc. To compute the last component DL
′
w−1, choose DˆLw−1 and
DˆL1.
Now we describe how to compute on two of DˆLv components to obtain a DL
′ component.
Assume two components are DˆL1 and DˆL2. First perform a circular shift on DˆL1:
pDL′1 =

pL′1 = Lˆ1,
pL′1,1,1 = Lˆ1,n,1, pL′2,1,1 = Lˆ2,n,1
{pL′1,i,1 = Lˆ1,i−1,1, pL′2,i,1 = Lˆ2,i−1,1}ni=2

Next, choose random Y ′′, Y ′′1,i, Y
′′
2,i ∈ Gs for i = 1 to n, then raise every element in DˆL2
to −xˆ and output the following DL′1:
DL′1 =
(
L′1 = Lˆ
−xˆ
2 · pL′1 · Y ′′, {L′1,i,1 = Lˆ−xˆ1,i,2 · pL′1,i,1 · Y ′′1,i, L′2,i,1 = Lˆ−xˆ2,i,2 · pL′2,i,1 · Y ′′2,i}ni=1
)
In this way, we will be able to compute DL′v for all v ∈W ′.
NB: If there is only one delegatable field in X, we have one delegation component DL1. In
Step 1 – 3, we use DL1 to randomize DK and DL1, all other computations are the same.
Query(SKX , C) Given a ciphertext and a secret key for X, where X ∈ Ωl?, compute the following:
C ′ · e(C0,K) ·
n∏
i=1
e(C1,i,K1,i)e(C2,i,K2,i)
It returns M , if M ∈M. Otherwise, it returns an error.
Correctness. To verify that the correctness holds for the scheme, we first show that the secret
keys obtained by Delegate algorithm have the same structures as those created directly by GenKey
algorithm. We focus on the decryption key component and the delegation component, respectively.
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The notation is the same as in the scheme. In the decryption components DK, for i = 1 to n, the
substitutions:
r′1,i = µ · r1,i,w + r1,i, r′2,i = µ · r2,i,w + r2,i
f ′1 = µ · f1 + f1, f ′2 = µ · f2 + f2
can be rewritten in the Delegate algorithm as
DK ′ =
 K ′ = R′5 ·Q′6 · h−γ ·∏ni=1 h−r′1,i1,i · h−r′2,i2,i · Y ′,
{K ′1,i = g
r′1,i
p · gf
′
1·a′i
q · Y ′1,i, K ′2,i = g
r′2,i
p · gf
′
2·a′i
q · Y ′2,i}ni=1

where a′i, for i = 1 to n, are coefficients of polynomial after the delegating operations. It is not
hard to see that the decryption key component is correctly distributed.
Similarly, in the delegation component DL, for i = 1 to n, for v ∈W ′ the substitutions:
r′1,i,v = µ · r1,i,w + r1,i,v, r′2,i,v = µ · r2,i,w + r2,i,v
f ′1 = µ · f1 + f1, f ′2 = µ · f2 + f2
can be rewritten in the Delegate algorithm as
∀v ∈ W ′ : DL′v =
 Lv = R′5,v ·Q′6,v ·∏ni=1 h−r′1,i,v1,i · h−r′2,i,v2,i · Y ′v ,
{L′1,i,v = g
r′1,i,v
p · gf
′
1·a′i
q · Y ′1,i,v, L′2,i,v = g
r′2,i,v
p · gf
′
2·a′i
q · Y ′2,i,v}ni=1

Obviously, they are also correctly distributed. Hence, we establish that the secret keys computed
from GenKey and Delegate have the correct distributions.
Now we need to prove that the scheme is consistent with respect to the Encrypt, GenKey, Dele-
gate and Query algorithms. Since we have already proven that the secret keys produced by GenKey
and Delegate have the correct distributions, we will only consider GenKey for consistency. The rest
of the proof is exactly the same argument shown in the work of Katz et al [19]. We omit it in here.
We also notice our delegation techniques can be applied in other systems based on the KSW
construction. As an extension of our study, we present a delegatable predicate encryption in
symmetric-key setting in Appendix C.
5 Proof of Security
Theorem 1 If G satisfies the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption, assumption 1 and 2,
then the delegatable predicate encryption scheme is selectively secure.
Our scheme is secure against adversaries, who are not allowed to perform delegation computa-
tion. In our security games, the adversaries can only request secret keys for full attribute vectors,
in which there are no delegatable fields. The secret keys can be computed from either the GenKey
or the Delegate algorithm. We note that delegated secret keys have some correlations with their
parent secret keys. As a result, the distributions of delegated keys differ from freshly generated
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keys. Our proof is inspired by the technique used in Shi and Waters’ work [25], which is called “key
indistinguishability”. Although delegated keys have correlations with their parent keys, they are
computationally indistinguishable from freshly generated keys computed by the GenKey algorithm.
This is a crucial step in our proof and simplifies our simulation. Now, instead of answering the ad-
versary’s query honestly, the simulator can give a freshly generated key to the adversary whenever
the adversary makes a fresh key query or a delegated key query. Intuitively, the notion of “key
indistinguishability” relies on the C3DH assumption: if we use a random hiding factor from Gr to
randomize each term in the key, then Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in the subgroup
Gp.
After “key indistinguishability” is established, the rest of the proof will be very similar to the
proof in Katz’s work [19]. It is not hard to see that by “key indistinguishability”, we effectively
reduce our security game to Katz’s original game, because the delegation key queries are treated
as fresh key queries. We provide a proof for Theorem 1 in Appendix B.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study delegation techniques in predicate encryption systems, which support
disjunctive predicate evaluation. We first provide security definitions for delegatable predicate
encryption and then give a delegatable scheme in the public-key setting supporting disjunctive
predicate evaluation. We also provide a delegatable scheme in the symmetric-key setting and
discuss the security issues.
In the future, we will focus on delegatable predicate encryption supporting disjunctive and
conjunctive normal form. Our aim is to find a delegatable system which can support arbitrary
combinations of disjunctive and conjunctive predicate evaluations. The ultimate goal is to achieve
delegation in all predicate systems.
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Appendices
A Full Security
We present a full security definition of our scheme in this section.
Definition 6 A delegatable predicate encryption scheme is fully secure if for all PPT adversaries
A, the advantage AdvA of A in the following game is a negligible function of security parameter λ:
Setup(1λ). A challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate public key PK and master secret
key MSK , PK is given to A.
Query phase 1. A adaptively makes a polynomial number of the following queries:
• Create secret key. A requests a secret key for a vector ~p ∈ Ωn corresponding to predicate
ORX(x), where X = (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl. C creates the secret key and gives it to A.
• Create delegated secret key. A requests a secret key for a vector ~p ∈ Ωn corresponding to
predicate ORX(x), where X = (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl. C chooses a random number i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ l and creates the secret key for ORXi(x), where Xi = (x1, . . . , xi). Using that
key as the parent key, C creates the key for ORX(x) in delegatable way.
Challenge. A outputs two pairs (A,M0), (B,M1) ∈ Ω×M, where attributes A,B correspond to
vectors ~a,~b ∈ Ωn. There are two constraints:
• Any key revealed to A are subject to the restriction such that ORX(A) = ORX(B), which
is equivalent to f~p(~a) = f~p(~b).
• If there is any ORX(A) = ORX(B) = 1, then it is required that M0 = M1.
C flips a random coin b. If b = 0 then A is given C = Encrypt(Mb, A) and if b = 1 then A is
given C = Encrypt(Mb, B).
Query phase 2. Repeat the Query phase 1 subject to the restrictions as before.
Guess. A outputs a guess b′ of b, and succeeds if b′ = b.
The advantage of A is defined to be AdvA = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
B Proof of Security
Now, we prove the theorem 1 using a sequence of games defined as follows.
We prove that our scheme satisfies Definition 2. We consider two cases: M0 = M1 and M0 6= M1.
Case 1: M0 = M1 = M
We define a sequence of games, Game0,Game1, . . . ,Game5.
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Game0: Let Game0 denote the real selective security game defined in Definition 2. The challenge
ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption of M using ~a. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R
Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~a ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game1: Game1 is almost identical to Game0, except in the way the keys are generated. In Game1,
whenever the adversary issues a “create delegated secret key” query, the challenger calls the GenKey
algorithm to generate a fresh key, and gives it to the adversary. The challenge ciphertext is still
generated as a proper encryption of M using ~a. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the
ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~a ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game2: Game2 differs from Game1 in the way the {C2,i} components are formed. We encrypt ~0 into
the {C2,i} components. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game3: We modify Game2 slightly into Game3. We generate the {C2,i} components using vector ~b.
For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game4: In Game4, we generate the {C1,i} components using vector ~0. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and
{R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game5: We modify Game4 slightly into Game5. We generate the {C1,i} components using vector ~b.
For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~b ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
In Game5 the challenge ciphertext is a proper encryption of M using ~b. So, the proof of the the-
orem is concluded once we show that the adversary cannot distinguish between Gamej and Gamej+1
for each j.
Case 2: M0 6= M1
In this case, according to Definition 2, the adversary is restricted to requesting keys corre-
sponding to vectors ~p for which 〈~p,~a〉 6= 0 and 〈~p,~b〉 6= 0, where ~a, ~b are the vectors output by the
adversary in Definition 2. Now, we define a sequence of games Game0,Game1, . . . ,Game7.
Game0: Let Game0 denote the real selective security game defined in Definition 2. The challenge
ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption of M0 using ~a. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R
Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M0 · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~a ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
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Game1: Game1 is almost identical to Game0, except in the way the keys are generated. In Game1,
whenever the adversary issues a “create delegated secret key” query, The challenger calls the GenKey
algorithm to generate a fresh key, and gives it to the adversary. The challenge ciphertext is still
generated as a proper encryption of M0 using ~a. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the
ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M0 · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~a ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game2: Game2 differs from Game1 in the way C
′ is formed. C ′ will be a proper encryption of
a random element MR ∈R GT instead of M0. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the
ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = MR · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~a ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game3: Game3 differs from Game2 in the way {C2,i} components are formed. We encrypt ~0 into
{C2,i} components. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, and MR ∈R GT , the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = MR · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game4: We modify Game3 slightly into Game4. We generate the {C2,i} components using vector ~b.
For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, and MR ∈R GT , the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = MR · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~a ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game5: Game5 differs from Game4 in the way {C1,i} components are formed. We encrypt ~0 into
{C1,i} components. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN , {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, and MR ∈R GT , the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = MR · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game6: Game6 is a proper encryption of a random element MR ∈R GT using ~b. For δ, α, β ∈R ZN ,
and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = MR · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~b ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
Game7: The challenge ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption of M1 using ~b. For δ, α, β ∈R
ZN , and {R3,i, R4,i} ∈R Gr, the ciphertext is
C =
(
C ′ = M1 · P δ, C0 = gδp, {C1,i = Hδ1,i ·Qα·~b ·R3,i, C2,i = Hδ2,i ·Qβ·~b ·R4,i}ni=1
)
.
We establish our theorem once we show that the adversary cannot distinguish between Gamej
and Gamej+1 for each j.
B.1 Security Proof of Case 1
We now focus on the proof of the first case: M0 = M1 = M .
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B.1.1 Indistinguishability of Game0 and Game1
To prove indistinguishability of Game0 and Game1, we perform a hybrid argument on the number
create delegated secret key queries issued by the adversary.
Definition 7 Let Game0,0 := Game0 represent the real game. Let q0 denote the number of create
delegated secret key queries issued by the adversary. Define a sequence of hybrid games Game0,i,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ q0. Game0,i differs from Game0 in the way that when the adversary issues the first
i create delegated secret key queries, instead of generating the keys with the Genkey and Delegate
algorithms, the challenger directly calls the Genkey algorithm to generate the keys. For all the
remaining queries, the challenger responds key queries honestly as in the real game Game0. We can
see that Game0,q0 is the same as Game1.
Claim 1 For all 0 ≤ d ≤ q0, no polynomially bounded adversary can distinguish Game0,d from
Game0,d+1 with more than negligible advantage.
If claim 1 can be proven, then indistinguishability of Game0 and Game1 follows by the hybrid
argument. To prove the claim, we rely on an assumption called l-composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman
assumption (l-C3DH). As shown in Shi and Water’s work [25], the l-C3DH assumption is implied
by the C3DH assumption. Here we give a slight modification on the l-C3DH assumption. It can be
shown that our assumption is implied by the C3DH assumption as in Shi and Water’s work [25].
For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (1λ):
(p, q, r, s,G,GT , e)
R← G(1λ), N ← pqrs, gp R← Gp, gq R← Gq, gr R← Gr, gs R← Gs
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yl, Z1, Z2, . . . , Zl, V,W
R← Gs
h1, h2, . . . , hl
R← Gp, hq R← Gq
τ
R← ZN
X ← ((N,G,GT , e), gq, gp, gr, gs, h1Z1, h2Z2, . . . , hlZl, hqV )
Q← (hτ1Y1, hτ2Y2, . . . , hτl Yl, hτqW )
Output(X,Q)
For an algorithm A, define A’s advantage in solving the above problem for G as:
lC3DHAdvG,A(1λ) := |Pr[A(X,Q) = 1]− Pr[A(X,R) = 1]|
where (X,Q)
R← P (1λ) and R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rl+1) R← Glps ×Gqs.
Definition 8 We say that G satisfies the l-composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption (C3DH) if
for any polynomial time algorithm A, its advantage lC3DHAdvG,A(1λ) is negligible in the security
parameter λ.
Proof of Claim 1: To prove the claim 1, we further define a sequence of hybrid games. Suppose
that in Game0,d,c where 0 ≤ c ≤ l, the simulator uses GenKey to create the key for the first c
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attributes in the attribute vector X, and then uses Delegate to compute the rest of the attributes
and obtains the full secret key (the key for the whole vector X). We show that a polynomial
time adversary cannot distinguish between Game0,d,c and Game0,d,c+1. It is not hard to see that
Game0,d = Game0,d,0 and Game0,d+1 = Game0,d,l. Hence, by the hybrid argument, Game0,d and
Game0,d+1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Now, we prove that a polynomial time adversary cannot distinguish between Game0,d,c and
Game0,d,c+1. Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between those
two games. We construct a simulator that leveragesA to break the following (2l)-C3DH assumption.
We use the notation ∀k, j to denote k ∈ [2], 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(p, q, r, s,G,GT , e)
R← G(1λ), N ← pqrs
gp
R← Gp, gq R← Gq, gr R← Gr, gs R← Gs
∀k, j : Yk,j , Zk,j R← Gs, vk,j R← Gp
∀k : Vk,Wk R← Gs, hk R← Gq
τ
R← ZN
X ← ((N,G,GT , e), gq, gp, gr, gs, ∀k, j : vk,jZk,j , ∀k : hkVk)
Q← (∀k, j : vτk,jYk,j , ∀k : hkτWk)
Output(X,Q)
The simulator tries to distinguish between (X,Q′ = Q) and (X,Q′ = R), where R is a random
vector from G2lps ×G2qs.
Init and Setup. The simulator begins by giving N to A, who outputs two vectors ~a,~b. For
1 ≤ j ≤ l, the simulator sets h1,j = gx1,jp , h2,j = gx2,jp , where x1,j , x2,j ∈ ZN . The rest of
the public parameters and the secret key components are picked normally as in the Setup
algorithm.
Query 1 and 2. The adversary makes a number of queries of two types: 1) Create secret key 2)
Create delegated secret key.
• Before A makes the (d + 1)th Create delegated secret key query, the simulator always
computes each secret key freshly at random using the GenKey algorithm.
• When A makes the (d+1)th Create delegated secret key query, assume the secret key cor-
responding to the first c attributes in the queried attribute vectorX = (x1, . . . , xc, xc+1, . . . , xl)
are computed freshly random as in the GenKey algorithm. The simulator then computes
the key corresponding to the rest of the attributes (xc+1, . . . , xl) using the Delegate algo-
rithm to obtain a key for the full attribute vector X. We compute the key for attribute
vector (x1, . . . , xc) as follows.
- DK: Choose random u˜1,i, u˜2,i ∈ Gp and Y˜ , Y˜1,i, Y˜2,i ∈ Gs for i = 1 to n (n = l + 1),
random R˜5 ∈ Gr and random Q˜6 ∈ Gq.
DK =
 K = R˜5 · Q˜6 · h−γ ·∏ni=1 u˜−x1,i1,i · u˜−x2,i2,i · Y˜ ,
{K1,i = u˜1,i · (h1V1)pi · Y˜1,i, K2,i = u˜2,i · (h2V2)pi · Y˜2,i}ni=1

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- DL: Let w denote the number of delegatable fields. In here w = (l − c). The
algorithm first computes w − 1 parallel components. Let W = {1, . . . , w − 1}. For
each v ∈ W, for i = 1 to n, choose random u˜1,i,v, u˜2,i,v ∈ Gp and Y˜v, Y˜1,i,v, Y˜2,i,v ∈ Gs.
For each v ∈ W, choose random R˜5,v ∈ Gr, and random Q˜6,v ∈ Gq. The delegation
component is
∀v ∈ W : DLv =
 Lv = R˜5,v · Q˜6,v ·∏ni=1 u˜−x1,i1,i,v · u˜−x2,i2,i,v · Y˜v,
{L1,i,v = u˜1,i,v · (h1V1)pi · Y˜1,i,v, L2,i,v = u˜2,i,v · (h1V1)pi · Y˜2,i,v}ni=1

NB: h1V1, h2V2 are elements from the (2l)-C3DH assumption. (p1, . . . , pn) are the
coefficients of the polynomial corresponding to attribute vector (x1, . . . , xc).
The wth delegation component will be computed in the following way:
For i = 1 to n, Y˜w, Y˜1,i,w, Y˜2,i,w ∈ Gs. Choose random R˜5,w ∈ Gr, and random
Q˜6,w ∈ Gq.
DLw =
 Lw = R˜5,w · Q˜6,w ·∏ni=1Q′1,i−x1,i ·Q′2,i−x2,i · Y˜w,
{L1,i,w = Q′1,i ·Q′1pi · Y˜1,i,w, L2,i,w = Q′2,i ·Q′2pi · Y˜2,i,w}ni=1

NB: We use the notation Q′1,i, Q
′
2,i, Q
′
1, Q
′
2 to index into the corresponding elements
from the 2l-C3DH problem.
Finnally, the simulator computes the key corresponding to the rest of attributes (xc+1, . . . , xl)
using the Delegate algorithm to obtain a key for the full attribute vector X.
Challenge. The simulator generates a proper encryption of M using ~a as normal.
Analysis. Notice that when Q′ = Q in the 2l-C3DH problem, the above simulation is distributed
exactly as in Game0,d,c, whereas if Q
′ = R the above simulation is identically distributed as
in Game0,d,c+1. The first case is easy to understand, for the second case, when Q
′ = R and
we delegate to compute a secret key for attributes (x1, . . . , xc+1), the distribution of the del-
egated key will be identical to that of the key computed directly from the GenKey algorithm,
which is equivalent to Game0,d,c+1. Hence, if a polynomial time adversary could successfully
distinguish between Game0,d,c and Game0,d,c+1, then the simulator would be able to solve the
2l-C3DH problem with non-negligible probability. 
Since we have proven the indistinguishability of Game0 and Game1, in the subsequent proofs, we
can treat all delegated key queries as GenKey queries. In this way, we reduce our security games
to the sequence of games which are very similar to Katz’s original security games [19]. Hence, the
subsequent proofs will be very similar to Katz’s proof, expect that we use groups whose order is the
product of four primes instead of three primes. However, for completeness, we will present them in
the next few sections.
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B.1.2 Indistinguishability of Game1 and Game2
Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between Game1 and Game2.
We construct a simulator that leverages A to break the Assumption 1. A simulator is given (N =
pqrs,G,GT , e) along with the elements gp, gr, gs, gqR1, hp = gbp, kp = gb
2
p , g
a
pgq, g
ab
p Q1, g
c
p, g
bc
p Q2R2,
and an element T = gb
2c
p gq
βgr
R3 , where β is either 0 or uniform in Zq.
Since gq is not provided to the simulator, we cannot sample a random element of Gq. However,
we could choose an independent random element QR ∈ Gqr def= Gq × Gr by selecting random
η1, η2 ∈ ZN and setting QR = (gqR1)η1 · gη2r . In the subsequent proofs, we will sample the random
element QR ∈ Gqr in this way.
Init and Setup. The simulator begins by giving N to A, who outputs two vectors ~a,~b. The
simulator chooses random {w1,i, w2,i} ∈ ZN , {R1,i, R2,i} ∈ Gr, γ ∈ Zp and h ∈ Gp, includes
(N,G,GT , e) in the public parameters, and sets the rest of the values as follows:
PK = (gp, gr, gs, gqR1, P = e(gp, h)
γ , {H1,i = (hp)aigpw1,iR1,i, H2,i = (kp)aigpw2,iR2,i}).
The simulator implicitly sets h1,i = h
ai
p gp
w1,i and h2,i = k
ai
p gp
w2,i . It’s not hard to see that
PK has the correct distribution. The simulator also stores h−γ for future use.
Query 1 and 2. The adversary makes a number of queries of two types: 1) Create secret key 2)
Create delegated secret key. The adversary will respond to all key queries with fresh random
keys as in the GenKey algorithm.
Suppose A makes a query for the vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pn), which corresponds to attribute
vector X = (x1, . . . , xl). Recall that (n = l + 1). Our security definition restricts the vectors
~p for which the adversary is allowed to request secret keys, but it’s not applied in here, since
the hybrid proof aims to show that the adversary cannot distinguish between properly formed
encryptions of ~a and improperly formed encryptions, which are an encryption of ~a and an
encryption of ~0.
The simulator first chooses random f ′1, f ′2, {r′1,i}, {r′2,i} ∈ ZN and S1,i, S2,i ∈ Gs. For all i the
simulator computes K1,i and K2,i as follows:
K1,i = (g
a
pgq)
f ′1pi · (gabp Q1)−f ′2pi · gpr′1,i · S1,i
= gp
(af ′1−abf ′2)·pi+r′1,i · g(f ′1−df ′2)·piq · S1,i
and
K2,i = (g
a
pgq)
f ′2pi · gr
′
2,i
p · S2,i
= gp
(af ′2pi+r
′
2,i) · gf ′2piq · S2,i
In the construction, the simulator implicitly sets:
r1,i = (af
′
1 − abf ′2) · pi + r′1,i (1)
r2,i = af
′
2pi + r
′
2,i (2)
f1 = f
′
1 − df ′2 (3)
f2 = f
′
2 (4)
d = loggq Q1 (5)
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All those values are each independently and uniformly distributed in ZN , just as they would
be in actual secret key components. Next, the simulator will construct the K element of the
decryption key as follows: Let k = 〈~p,~a〉. The simulator chooses random QR ∈ Gqr, S ∈ Gs
and computes
K = QR · h−γ · (gabp Q1)−k·f ′1
·∏i(gapgq)−f ′1piw1,i−f ′2piw2,i · (gabp Q1)f ′2piw1,i · gp−w1,i·r′1,i−w2,i·r′2,i · hp−ai·r′1,i · kp−ai·r′2,i · S
The simulator then hands the adversary SK~p = (K, {K1,i,K2,i}ni=1) as the key. To check that
the K component has the correct distribution, let Kp, Kq, Kr and Ks denote the projections of
K in Gp, Gq, Gr and Gs, respectively. It is easy to see that Kq, Kr and Ks are independently
and uniformly distributed, as required. Furthermore,
Kp = gp
−abkf ′1 ·∏i gp−af ′1piw1,i−af ′2piw2,igpabf ′2piw1,igp−w1,i·r′1,i−w2,i·r′2,ihp−ai·r′1,ikp−ai·r′2,i
= hp
−akf ′1∏
i
(
hp
−ai·r′1,igp−w1,ir
′
1,igp
−w1,ipi(af ′1−abf ′2)
)
·
(
kp
−air′2,igp−w2,ir
′
2,igp
−w2,iaf ′2pi
)
=
∏
i hp
−apiaif ′1 ·
(
hp
−ai·r′1,igp−w1,ir
′
1,igp
−w1,ipi(af ′1−abf ′2)
)
·
(
hp
abpiaif
′
2 · hp−abpiaif ′2
)
·
(
kp
−air′2,igp−w2,ir
′
2,igp
−w2,iaf ′2pi
)
Based on the fact k = 〈~p,~a〉 = Σipiai and using equations (1) and (2), we obtain
Kp
=
∏
i
(
hp
−ai·r′1,igp−w1,ir
′
1,ihp
−aipi(af ′1−abf ′2)gp−w1,ipi(af
′
1−abf ′2)
)
·
(
kp
−air′2,igp−w2,ir
′
2,ikp
−aiaf ′2pigp−w2,iaf
′
2pi
)
=
∏
i (hp
aigp
w1,i)−r1,i (kpaigpw2,i)−r2,i =
∏
i h1,i
−r1,ih2,i−r2,i
We can see Kp has the correct distribution. Hence, K has the correct distribution. When
we consider the distribution of Kp, the element of h
−γ is not included, by our simulation, we
can ensure h−γ is correctly formed.
Challenge. We now generate challenge ciphertext. Chooses random R7,i, R8,i ∈ Gr and set C ′ =
Me(gcp, h
γ), C0 = g
c
p. The ciphertexts C1,i, C2,i are
C1,i =
(
gbcp Q2R2
)ai · (gcp)w1,i ·R7,i
= hp
aicgp
w1,icQ2
aiR′7,i
= (h1,i)
cQ2
aiR′7,i
C2,i = T
ai · (gcp)w2,i ·R8,i
= (h2,i)
c
(
gβq
)ai
R′8,i
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NB: R′7,i, R
′
8,i are random elements of Gr whose exact values are unimportant.
Analysis. Notice that when β is random the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in Game1,
whereas if β = 0 the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed as in Game2 Hence, if a
polynomial time adversary could successfully distinguish between Game1 and Game2, then
the simulator would break the assumption 1 with non-negligible probability. 
B.1.3 Indistinguishability of Game2 and Game3
Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between Game2 and Game3.
We construct a simulator that leverages A to break the Assumption 1. A simulator is given (N =
pqrs,G,GT , e) along with the elements gp, gr, gs, gqR1, hp = gbp, kp = gb
2
p , g
a
pgq, g
ab
p Q1, g
c
p, g
bc
p Q2R2,
and an element T = gb
2c
p gq
βgr
R3 , where β is either 0 or uniform in Zq. Note that we can efficiently
sample uniform elements of Gr,Gs and Gqr.
Init and Setup. The simulator begins by giving N to A, who outputs two vectors ~a,~b. The
simulator chooses random {w1,i, w2,i} ∈ ZN , {R1,i, R2,i} ∈ Gr, γ ∈ Zp and h ∈ Gp, includes
(N,G,GT , e) in the public parameters, and sets the rest of values as follows:
PK = (gp, gr, gs, gqR1, P = e(gp, h)
γ , {H1,i = (hp)aigpw1,iR1,i, H2,i = (kp)bigpw2,iR2,i}).
The simulator implicitly sets h1,i = h
ai
p gp
w1,i and h2,i = k
bi
p gp
w2,i . It’s not hard to see that
PK has the correct distribution. The simulator also stores h−γ for future use.
Query 1 and 2. The adversary makes a number of queries of two types: 1) Create secret key 2)
Create delegated secret key. The adversary will respond to all key queries with fresh random
keys as in the GenKey algorithm.
Suppose A makes a query for the vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pn), which corresponds to attribute
vector X = (x1, . . . , xl). Recall that (n = l + 1). We will apply restrictions specified in
Definition 2 on the vectors ~p for which the adversary is allowed to request secret keys. We
consider two cases: 1) 〈~p,~a〉 = 〈~p,~b〉 = 0, 2) 〈~p,~a〉 6= 0 and 〈~p,~b〉 6= 0.
Case 1. In the case of 〈~p,~a〉 = 〈~p,~b〉 = 0, the simulator first chooses random f1, f2, {r′1,i}, {r′2,i} ∈
ZN and S1,i, S2,i ∈ Gs. For all i the simulator computes K1,i and K2,i as follows:
K1,i = (g
a
pgq)
f1pi · gpr′1,i · S1,i
= gp
af1pi+r
′
1,i · gf1piq · S1,i
and
K2,i = (g
a
pgq)
f2pi · gr
′
2,i
p · S2,i
= gp
af2pi+r
′
2,i · gf2piq · S2,i
In the construction, values f1, f2 are random and the simulator implicitly sets:
r1,i = af1pi + r
′
1,i (6)
r2,i = af2pi + r
′
2,i (7)
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All those values are each independently and uniformly distributed in ZN , just as they would
be in actual secret key components. Next, the simulator will construct the K element of the
decryption key as follows: the simulator chooses random QR ∈ Gqr, S ∈ Gs and computes
K = QR · h−γ ·∏i(gapgq)−f1piw1,i−f2piw2,i · gp−w1,i·r′1,i−w2,i·r′2,i · hp−ai·r′1,i · kp−bi·r′2,i · S.
The simulator then hands the adversary SK~p = (K, {K1,i,K2,i}ni=1) as the key. To check that
the K component has the correct distribution, let Kp, Kq, Kr and Ks denote the projections of
K in Gp, Gq, Gr and Gs, respectively. It is easy to see that Kq, Kr and Ks are independently
and uniformly distributed, as required. Furthermore, we can see that
Kp =
∏
i gp
−af1piw1,i−af2piw2,igp−w1,i·r
′
1,i−w2,i·r′2,ihp−ai·r
′
1,ikp
−bi·r′2,i
=
∏
i hp
−af1aipi · kp−af2bipigp−af1piw1,i−af2piw2,igp−w1,i·r′1,i−w2,i·r′2,ihp−ai·r′1,ikp−bi·r′2,i
using the fact that
∏
i hp
−af1aipi = hp−af1·Σiaipi = 1 =
∏
i kp
−af2bipi (Recall that 〈~p,~a〉 =
〈~p,~b〉 = 0). Using equations (6) and (7), we make some algebraic manipulation on Kp as
follows:
Kp =
∏
i
(
hp
−af1aipi−ai·r′1,igp−af1piw1,i−w1,ir
′
1,i
)
·
(
kp
−af2bipi−bi·r′2,igp−af2piw2,i−w2,ir
′
2,i
)
=
∏
i (hp
aigp
w1,i)−r1,i
(
kp
bigp
w2,i
)−r2,i
=
∏
i h1,i
−r1,ih2,i−r2,i
We can see Kp has the correct distribution. Hence, K has the correct distribution.
Case 2. In the case of 〈~p,~a〉 = ca 6= 0 and 〈~p,~b〉 = cb 6= 0, the simulator first chooses random
f ′1, f ′2, {r′1,i}, {r′2,i} ∈ ZN and S1,i, S2,i ∈ Gs. For all i the simulator computes K1,i and K2,i
as follows:
K1,i = (g
a
pgq)
f ′1pi · (gabp Q1)−cbf ′2pi · gpr′1,i · S1,i
= gp
(af ′1−abcbf ′2)·pi+r′1,i · g(f ′1−dcbf ′2)·piq · S1,i
and
K2,i = (g
a
pgq)
caf ′2pi · gr
′
2,i
p · S2,i
= gp
(acaf ′2pi+r
′
2,i) · gcaf ′2piq · S2,i
In the construction, the simulator implicitly sets:
r1,i = (af
′
1 − abcbf ′2) · pi + r′1,i (8)
r2,i = acaf
′
2pi + r
′
2,i (9)
f1 = f
′
1 − dcbf ′2 (10)
f2 = caf
′
2 (11)
d = loggq Q1 (12)
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f1 and {r1,i, r2,i} are independently and uniformly distributed in ZN , f2 is also uniformly
distributed in ZN as long as gcd(ca, N) = 1. Next, the simulator will construct the K
element of the decryption key as follows: the simulator chooses random QR ∈ Gqr, S ∈ Gs
and computes
K = QR · (gabp Q1)−ca·f ′1
·∏i(gapgq)−f ′1piw1,i−f ′2capiw2,i · (gabp Q1)f ′2cbpiw1,i · gp−w1,i·r′1,i−w2,i·r′2,i · hp−ai·r′1,i · kp−bi·r′2,i · S.
The simulator then hands the adversary SK~p = (K, {K1,i,K2,i}ni=1) as the key. To check that
the K component has the correct distribution, let Kp, Kq, Kr and Ks denote the projections of
K in Gp, Gq, Gr and Gs, respectively. It is easy to see that Kq, Kr and Ks are independently
and uniformly distributed, as required. Furthermore,
Kp = gp
−abcaf ′1 ·∏i gp−af ′1piw1,i−af ′2capiw2,i · gpabf ′2cbpiw1,i · gp−w1,i·r′1,i−w2,i·r′2,ihp−ai·r′1,ikp−bi·r′2,i
=
∏
i hp
−apiaif ′1 · gp−af ′1piw1,i−af ′2capiw2,i · gpabf ′2cbpiw1,i · (h1,i)−r
′
1,i(h2,i)
−r′2,i
= hp
cacbabf
′
2 · hp−cacbabf ′2
∏
i gp
−af ′2capiw2,i · gpabf ′2cbpiw1,i(h1,i)−r
′
1,i−apif ′1(h2,i)−r
′
2,i
=
∏
i hp
aipicbabf
′
2 · kp−cabipiaf ′2 · gp−af ′2capiw2,i · gpabf ′2cbpiw1,i(h1,i)−r
′
1,i−apif ′1(h2,i)−r
′
2,i
=
∏
i (h1,i)
−r′1,i−apif ′1+abf ′2cbpi(h2,i)−r
′
2,i−acapif ′2 =
∏
i (h1,i)
−r1,i(h2,i)−r2,i
We can see Kp has the correct distribution. Hence, K has the correct distribution.
Challenge. We now generate a challenge ciphertext. Choose random R7,i, R8,i ∈ Gr and set
C ′ = Me(gcp, hγ), C0 = gcp. The ciphertexts C1,i, C2,i are
C1,i =
(
gbcp Q2R2
)ai · (gcp)w1,i ·R7,i
= hp
aicgp
w1,icQ2
aiR′7,i
= (h1,i)
cQ2
aiR′7,i
C2,i = T
bi · (gcp)w2,i ·R8,i
= (h2,i)
c
(
gβq
)bi
R′8,i
NB: R′7,i, R
′
8,i are random elements of Gr whose exact values are not important.
Analysis. Notice that when β is random the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in Game3,
whereas if β = 0 the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed as in Game2 Hence, if a
polynomial time adversary could successfully distinguish between Game2 and Game3, then
the simulator would break the assumption 1 with non-negligible probability. 
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B.1.4 Completing the Proof
It’s not hard to see the proof that Game3 and Game4 are indistinguishable parallels the proof that
Game2 and Game3 are indistinguishable. Similarly, the proof that Game4 and Game5 are indistin-
guishable parallels the proof that Game1 and Game2 are indistinguishable. Hence, we complete our
security proof for the case where M0 = M1 = M .
B.2 Security Proof of Case 2
We now consider the proof where M0 6= M1.
B.2.1 Indistinguishability of Game0 and Game1
The proof for indistinguishability of Game0 and Game1 is very similar to that of section B.1.1.
We omit it in here.
B.2.2 Indistinguishability of Game1 and Game2
Suppose a polynomial time adversary A can successfully distinguish between Game1 and Game2.
We construct a simulator that leverages A to break the Assumption 2. A simulator is given
(N = pqrs,G,GT , e) along with the elements gp, gq, gr, gs, h, gcp, hcQ1, g
γ
pQ2, e(gp, h)
γ , and an
element T which is either equal to e(gp, h)
γc or is uniformly distributed in GT .
Init and Setup. The simulator begins by giving N to A, who outputs two vectors ~a,~b. The
simulator chooses random {w1,i, w2,i} ∈ ZN , {R1,i, R2,i} ∈ Gr, R0 ∈ Gr, includes (N,G,GT , e)
in the public parameters, and sets the rest of values as follows:
PK = (gp, gr, gs, Q = gqR0, P = e(gp, h)
γ , {H1,i = haigpw1,iR1,i, H2,i = haigpw2,iR2,i}).
The simulator implicitly sets h1,i = h
aigp
w1,i and h2,i = h
aigp
w2,i . It’s not hard to see that
PK has the correct distribution.
Query 1 and 2. The adversary makes a number of queries of two types: 1) Create secret key 2)
Create delegated secret key. The adversary will respond to all key queries with fresh random
keys as in the GenKey algorithm.
Suppose A makes a query for the vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pn), which corresponds to attribute
vector X = (x1, . . . , xl). Recall that (n = l + 1). The restriction is that A can only request
secret keys corresponding to different vectors ~p, where 〈~p,~a〉 6= 0.
Let k = 1/2 · 〈~p,~a〉 mod N . The simulator first chooses random f ′1, f ′2, {r′1,i}, {r′2,i} ∈ ZN and
S1,i, S2,i ∈ Gs. For all i the simulator computes K1,i and K2,i as follows:
K1,i = (g
γ
pQ2)
−kpi · gqf ′1pi · gr
′
1,i
p · S1,i
= g
−kpiγ+r′1,i
p · g(f
′
1−kc)·pi
q · S1,i
and
K2,i = (g
γ
pQ2)
−kpi · gqf ′2pi · gr
′
2,i
p · S2,i
= g
−kpiγ+r′2,i
p · g(f
′
2−kc)·pi
q · S2,i
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In the construction, the simulator implicitly sets:
r1,i = −kpiγ + r′1,i (13)
r2,i = −kpiγ + r′2,i (14)
f1 = (f
′
1 − kc) (15)
f2 = (f
′
2 − kc) (16)
c = loggq Q2 (17)
All those values are each independently and uniformly distributed in ZN . Next, the simulator
will construct the K element of the decryption key as follows: the simulator chooses random
QR ∈ Gqr, S ∈ Gs and computes
K = QR ·∏i ((gw1,ip hai)−r′1,i · (gγpQ2)kpiw1,i) · ((gw2,ip hai)−r′2,i · (gγpQ2)kpiw2,i) · S
The simulator then hands the adversary SK~p = (K, {K1,i,K2,i}ni=1) as the key. To check that
the K component has the correct distribution, let Kp, Kq, Kr and Ks denote the projections of
K in Gp, Gq, Gr and Gs, respectively. It is easy to see that Kq, Kr and Ks are independently
and uniformly distributed, as required. Furthermore,
∏
i (g
w1,i
p hai)
−r′1,i · (gγp )kpiw1,i =
∏
i g
−w1,ir′1,i+kγpiw1,i
p · h−air′1,i
=
∏
i g
−w1,i(r1,i+kpiγ)+kγpiw1,i
p · h−ai(r1,i+kpiγ)
=
∏
i (h
aig
w1,i
p )
−r1,i · h−γkpiai = h−γ/2 ·∏i h−r1,i1,i
Based on the fact 〈~p,~a〉 = 1/2k mod N , we obtain that
Kp =
∏
i
(
(g
w1,i
p hai)
−r′1,i · (gγp )kpiw1,i
)
·
(
(g
w2,i
p hai)
−r′2,i · (gγp )kpiw2,i
)
= h−γ ·∏i h−r1,i1,i · h−r2,i2,i
We can see Kp has the correct distribution. Hence, K has the correct distribution.
Challenge. We now generate a challenge ciphertext. Choose random R7,i, R8,i ∈ Gr, Q′1 ∈ Gq
and set C ′ = M0 · T , C0 = gcp. The ciphertexts C1,i, C2,i are
C1,i = (g
c
p)
w1,i · (hcQ1)ai ·R7,i
= (haigp
w1,i)c ·Qai1 ·R7,i
C1,i = (g
c
p)
w2,i · (hcQ1)ai · (Q′1)xi ·R8,i
= (haigp
w2,i)c · (Q1Q′1)ai ·R8,i
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Analysis. Notice that when T = e(gp, h)
γc the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in
Game1, whereas if T is chosen uniformly from GT the challenge ciphertext is identically
distributed as in Game2. Hence, if a polynomial time adversary could successfully distinguish
between Game1 and Game2, then the simulator would break the assumption 2 with non-
negligible probability. 
B.2.3 Completing the Proof
Indistinguishability of Game2 and Game6 follows mutatis mutandis from the proofs in Sections
B.1.2 and B.1.3. The proof that Game6 and Game7 are indistinguishable is symmetric to the
proof that Game1 and Game2 are indistinguishable. Hence, we complete our proof.
C Applications of the System to Predicate Privacy
Our delegation scheme is based on the KSW system [19], which is in public-key setting. The
KSW construction inherently cannot protect the predicate privacy, since an adversary can always
encrypt a plaintext of his choice, and evaluate if the resulting ciphertext satisfies the predicate
associated with a secret key. With the brute-force technique, the adversary could possibly obtain
some information about a predicate encoded in the secret key. To cope with those situations, Shen
et al [23] proposed a predicate encryption system in the symmetric-key setting, which protects both
data privacy and predicate privacy. We notice that our delegating technique can also be applied
to the SSW scheme [23], since their scheme is based on the inner product predicates. Hence, as a
side product of our scheme, we present a delegatable predicate encryption scheme in symmetric-key
setting as follows.
Setup(1λ) The setup algorithm first picks random large primes p, q, r, s and creates groups G and
GT of composite order N = pqrs. It then computes gp, gq, gr, and gs as generators of group
Gp,Gq,Gr, and Gs, respectively. It also chooses random h1,i, h2,i, u1,i, u2,i ∈ Gp, where i = 1
to n, and random γ ∈ Zp, h ∈ Gp. The secret key MSK is
(gp, gq, gr, gs, h
−γ , P = e(gp, h)γ , {h1,i, h2,i, u1,i, u2,i}ni=1).
Encrypt(MSK , w ∈ Ω,M ∈ M ⊆ GT ) Assume that Ω ⊆ ZN . M is some efficiently-recognizable
subgroup of GT . To encrypt a message M for the attribute w, the algorithm computes (w1 =
w0 mod N, . . . , wn = w
n−1 mod N). Then, it chooses random y, z, α, β ∈ ZN , random
S, S0 ∈ Gs, and R1,i, R2,i ∈ Gr for i = 1 to n. The ciphertext is
C =
 C ′ = M · P (y+z), C = S · gyp , C0 = S0 · gzp,
{C1,i = hy1,i · uz1,i · gα·wiq ·R1,i, C2,i = hy2,i · uz2,i · gβ·wiq ·R2,i}ni=1.

GenKey(MSK , X ∈ Ωl?) Assume Ω? = Ω ∪ {?}, where ? is a delegatable field. Let X =
(x1, . . . , xl) ∈ Ωl?. Assume I(X) denotes the set of all indices u where xu ∈ Ω. This al-
gorithm encodes X as a univariate polynomial p(x) =
∏
u∈I(X)(x − xu) mod N , and then
extends the equation to obtain p(x) = aI+1x
I + · · · + a1x0 mod N , where aI+1, . . . , a1 are
the coefficients of the resulting polynomial and I is the number of all fixed fields. The secret
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key for X consists of two parts: a decryption key component DK and a delegation component
DL.
• DK: Choose random r1,i, r2,i ∈ ZN , random S1,i, S2,i ∈ Gs for i = 1 to n (n = l + 1),
and random f1, f2 ∈ ZN , random R,R0 ∈ Gr. The decryption key is
DK =
 K = R · h−γ ·∏ni=1 h−r1,i1,i · h−r2,i2,i , K0 = R0 · h−γ ·∏ni=1 u−r1,i1,i · u−r2,i2,i
{K1,i = gr1,ip · gf1·aiq · S1,i, K2,i = gr2,ip · gf2·aiq · S2,i}ni=1

• DL: Let w denote the number of delegatable fields. The algorithm computes w parallel
components. They have similar structures with the decryption key component. The main
difference is that only the decryption key component contains the master secret h−γ . Let
W = {1, . . . , w}. For each v ∈ W, for i = 1 to n, choose random r1,i,v, r2,i,v ∈ ZN and
S1,i,v, S2,i,v ∈ Gs. For each v ∈ W, choose random Rv, R0,v ∈ Gr. The delegation
component is
∀v ∈ W : DL =
 Lv = Rv ·∏ni=1 h−r1,i,v1,i · h−r2,i,v2,i , L0,v = R0,v ·∏ni=1 u−r1,i,v1,i · u−r2,i,v2,i
{L1,i,v = gr1,i,vp · gf1·aiq · S1,i,v, L2,i,v = gr2,i,vp · gf2·aiq · S2,i,v}ni=1

NB: Set ai = 0 for i > I + 1.
Delegate(SKX∈Ωl? , xˆ ∈ Ω) Given a secret key for X and an attribute xˆ, this algorithm fixes one of
the delegatable fields of X with xˆ to obtain X ′, and computes the secret key for X ′. Clearly,
if we can perform delegation on one field, then we can perform delegation on multiple fields.
If there is no delegatable field, the algorithm simply aborts. In here, we stress that this
algorithm can only be carried out by authorized users who have right to decrypt any ciphertext
in the system.
Step 1: Let (DK,DL) denote the secret key for X with w delegatable fields. Pick a random
µ ∈ ZN and rerandomize the wth delegation component DLw by raising every element
in DLw to µ:
DˆL =
(
Lˆ = Lµw, Lˆ0 = L
µ
0,w, {Lˆ1,i = Lµ1,i,w, Lˆ2,i = Lµ2,i,w}ni=1
)
Step 2: Multiply the decryption key component DK by DˆL:
DˆK =
(
Kˆ = K · Lˆ, Kˆ0 = K0 · Lˆ0, {Kˆ1,i = K1,i · Lˆ1,i, Kˆ2,i = K2,i · Lˆ2,i}ni=1
)
Step 3: Multiply the delegation component DLv by DˆL for all v ∈ W ′, where W ′ =
{1, . . . , w − 1}:
∀v ∈ W ′ : DˆLv =
(
Lˆv = Lv · Lˆ, Lˆ0,v = L0,v · Lˆ0, {Lˆ1,i,v = L1,i,v · Lˆ1,i, Lˆ2,i,v = L2,i,v · Lˆ2,i}ni=1
)
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Step 4: Perform a circular shift on the randomized decryption key component DˆK:
pDK =

pK = Kˆ, pK0 = Kˆ0,
pK1,1 = Kˆ1,n, pK2,1 = Kˆ2,n
{pK1,i = Kˆ1,i−1, pK2,i = Kˆ2,i−1}ni=2

Step 5: Compute decryption key component DK ′ for X ′. DK ′ is computed from two com-
ponents: 1) pDK, the shifted decryption key component of secret key for X. 2) DˆL1,
the randomized delegation component for X. Raise every element in DˆL1 to −xˆ, output
the following DK ′:
DK ′ =
(
K ′ = Lˆ−xˆ1 · pK, K ′0 = Lˆ−xˆ0,1 · pK0, {K ′1,i = Lˆ−xˆ1,i,1 · pK1,i, K ′2,i = Lˆ−xˆ2,i,1 · pK2,i}ni=1
)
Step 6: Compute delegation component DL′ of X ′. DL′ is computed from the randomized
delegation component DˆLv for all v ∈ W ′, where W ′ = {1, . . . , w − 1}. Generally
speaking, each time the algorithm performs some computations on two of the DˆLv
components to obtain a DL′ component, the resulting DL′ consists of w components.
For example, choose DˆL1 and DˆL2 to compute DL
′
1, then choose DˆL2 and DˆL3 to
compute DL′2, etc. To compute the last component DL′w−1, choose DˆLw−1 and DˆL1.
Now we describe how to compute on two of the DˆLv components to obtain a DL
′
component. Assume two components are DˆL1 and DˆL2. First perform a circular shift
on DˆL1:
pDL′1 =

pL′1 = Lˆ1, pL′0,1 = Lˆ0,1,
pL′1,1,1 = Lˆ1,n,1, pL′2,1,1 = Lˆ2,n,1
{pL′1,i,1 = Lˆ1,i−1,1, pL′2,i,1 = Lˆ2,i−1,1}ni=2

Next, raise every element in DˆL2 to −xˆ and output the following DL′1:
DL′1 =
(
L′1 = Lˆ
−xˆ
2 · pL′1, L′0,1 = Lˆ−xˆ0,2 · pL′0,1, {L′1,i,1 = Lˆ−xˆ1,i,2 · pL′1,i,1, L′2,i,1 = Lˆ−xˆ2,i,2 · pL′2,i,1}ni=1
)
In this way, we will be able to compute DL′v for all v ∈W ′.
NB: If there is only one delegatable field in X, we have one delegation component DL1. In
Step 1 – 3, we use DL1 to randomize DK and DL1, all other computations are the same.
Query(SKX , C) Given a ciphertext and a secret key for X, where X ∈ Ωl?, compute the following:
C ′ · e(C,K) · e(C0,K0) ·
n∏
i=1
e(C1,i,K1,i)e(C2,i,K2,i)
It returns M , if M ∈M. Otherwise, it returns an error.
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It can be verified that the above construction is internally consistent. The security definition is
very similar to that of the SSW [23] system, except that the extra delegation key queries are added
in the definition. For the security proof of the above system, we can apply the proof technique
which is similar to our proof. We can prove the indistinguishability of key queries and delegating
key queries, and reduce the security games to the original games of SSW. The details are out of
the scope of this paper, we omit them in here.
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